In this paper, we test two different kinds of bias; the favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog and the home team bias, and distinguish between the two, using a distinctive feature of the Australian Football League (AFL), that many games are played on neutral grounds. This is the first empirical study, to the best of our knowledge, to make a clear distinction between the two types of bias. We conduct our tests by subjecting 2001-2004 data for the AFL to detailed scrutiny, using standard econometric weak-form efficiency models of point spread and fixed odds betting markets. Where the results suggest the presence of a bias, we test potential profitability via betting simulation. We are able to reject the existence of any significant pure favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog bias in either market, and to demonstrate the existence of a significant bias in favor of teams with an apparent home ground advantage in games played outside Victoria in the point spread market and in the fixed odds market 
Introduction
Risk aversion is a standard assumption in traditional economic theory. Yet, the generality of risk aversion seems to stop at betting markets, where most of the literature confirms the tendency of bettors to under-bet favorites and over-bet longshots/underdogs 2 relative to their chances of winning, this bias being known as the favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog bias. 3 Only a handful of papers, all using data on odds betting systems, present an empirical exception to this bias, i.e., a reverse favorite-longshot bias. 4 The concept of home ground advantage has long been recognized as a contributing factor for sporting success. 5 Schwartz & Barsky (1977) proposed three explanations why the home ground advantage exists: learning factors (stadium and playing surface familiarity 6 ), travel factors (physical and mental fatigue, disruption of routine) and crowd factors (social support). Courneya & Carron (1991) suggest also possible referee bias. The absolute extent of influence of the three factors varies from one sport to another.
Our goal in this paper is to disentangle the favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog biases, on the one hand, from any extant home team bias, on the other. This would be a novel contribution to the literature. Our analysis is based on four seasons of Australian Rules Football, 2001 Football, -2004 We test the two dominant betting methods in team sports; the "Point spread" (also known as "line")
wagering market, which is the dominant form of wagering on basketball and American football contests 7 , and the fixed odds win (also known as "win") wagering market, which predominates in US baseball. 8 9 As it happens, both of these markets operate on Australian Rules Football, yet economic literature relating to "Aussie Rules" is quite limited.
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We use a straight-forward method to test for the existence of these biases, facilitated by the fact that many games in our data sample are played on neutral grounds, so that the home ground bias is evidently absent. Given the number of games played on neutral grounds, we are able to test unambiguously for the existence of any significant favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog bias in either market for each of the four seasons individually and for the whole period.
Following the specific home ground character of the AFL, as explained below, we divide the data set into four categories, according to the nature of a priori home ground advantage and location of the relevant game; games played on neutral grounds regardless of location, games played outside Victoria where there is a priori home ground advantage, games played in Melbourne where there is a priori home ground advantage and games played in Geelong where Geelong Cats always has an a priori home ground advantage. 11 The reason for dividing the data set into three where there is a priori home ground advantage is that the distances traveled and/or the extent of crowd support vary considerably as between these three groups of locations. While there is travel symmetry vis-à-vis games played in
Melbourne and outside Victoria, crowd support differs considerably. Thus, for example, the Sydney Swans were originally the South Melbourne Swans and thus continue to maintain a supporter base in
Melbourne. Also, part of the Brisbane Lions is based on a former Melbourne team, the Fitzroy Lions.
Finally, teams from outside Victoria play far more games in Victoria than do Victorian teams outside their state. Consequently, the home ground advantage enjoyed by Melbourne teams is likely to be less than that enjoyed by home teams playing outside Victoria. These assertions are supported by the data shown below in Table 2 .
Our most clear-cut finding is that both betting markets are weak-form efficient when games are played either on neutral grounds or in Melbourne. Thus, we are able to reject the existence of any significant pure favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog bias in either market and any home or away team bias in games played in Melbourne. On this basis, we would imply that any bias(es) found in other subsets of the data would most likely be due to a home or away team bias and not due to a favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog bias. We demonstrate the existence of a significant bias in favor of teams with an apparent home ground advantage in games played outside Victoria in both markets for some seasons and the whole period, while games in same Geelong results are similar in the line market but the fixed odds market appears to be efficient. Betting simulations which attempt to exploit these inefficiencies yield modest profits.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: A summary of the basics of Australian Rules football, home ground advantage and betting markets relevant to an understanding of this paper is presented in Section 2. Section 3 describes our data set and highlights the problems to be explained, section 4 discusses the weak efficiency econometric tests and the betting simulations, while section 5 concludes the paper.
Australian Rules football -basics, home grounds and betting

Basics
Australian Rules football is a high scoring, continuous-action game. 
Home grounds
Except for the Geelong Cats, all the other teams in the AFL derived from Melbourne and initially had their own home grounds. 
Betting
Legalized betting in Australia is one of the largest industries nation-wide, involving both amateur and professional bettors. During 1997/8 82% of all adults participated in a gambling activity (Productivity Commission, 1999) . In 2002/3, total gambling expenditure within Australia was A$15.3 billion (The Australian National University, 2004), approximately 2% of GDP. Sports betting comprise 0.5% of the above amount, while racing is 12.3%.
In point spread wagering on most sports, bookmakers offer bettors odds that a team will win by more than a certain number of points, known as the line. A typical line wager in the AFL requires that the bettor risk $1 for the chance to receive around $1.9 if successful. 17 This $1.9-for-$1 dividend requires that bettors must pick winners in 52.63 percent of bets to break even.
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In fixed odds wagering, the bookmaker offers to pay a ratio of the amount wagered if a certain team wins. The fixed odds wager in the AFL requires that the bettor risk $1 for the chance to receive a fixed sum if successful. 20 As expressed below, the bookmaker sets odds to earn around five percent of the total amount bet if his book is balanced. 21 Therefore the bettor must pick around 52.5 percent of winners to break even. There is no consensus in the literature whether these adjustments are made to reflect the collective judgment of gamblers about the outcome or because the bookmakers are setting prices in order to exploit bettors' biases. Levitt (2004) , using data on prices and quantities of bets placed, found support for the latter hypothesis; i.e., that bookmakers do not try to set prices to equalize the amount of money bet on either side of a wager.
Other betting methods are also available in the AFL, but a discussion of these is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The data
The data used in this paper are derived from publicly available sources, 25 i. seasons, for a total of 740 games (all home and away games plus the finals), and 1480 team observations. Line data are missing for 86 games, since the bookmakers do not publish a line in a match where both teams have equal (or very close) betting odds.
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In each team observation we denote the team from whose perspective the spread and result are defined as the team of record. We use the official home team as the team of record, as do Gandar et al (1988) and most of the other studies.
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In order to identify real a priori home ground advantage, we define the variable HOME as follows:
HOME equals 1 if this home team is from different city than the away team, and the ground is the home team's ground (i.e., home advantage); HOME equals 0 if both teams are from the ground's city or from two cities other than the ground's city (i. 
Measuring weak efficiency: Econometric tests and Betting systems
Econometric Tests
Before proceeding to list other difficulties, it will prove useful to define some terms. Let LINE denote the point spread in the bookmaker's betting line and PS denote the actual point spread between the two teams (defined in a way that is consistent with the definition of LINE, i.e., according to the official home team), and let WIN denote the actual winner in the game (defined as a variable equal to 1 for the winning team, 0 for the losing team and 0.5 for draws). Further, let:
If bettors use the available information efficiently, then we would expect the point spread/fixed odds to be the best unbiased forecast of the game's outcome. Let i and j denote two different teams playing in game t. Then, in general, the Efficient Market Hypothesis requires that:
where Ω t-1 is the set of all information available to the bettor prior to the game.
Similarly to Stern (1991) in the NFL and Bailey & Clarke (2004) in the AFL (testing more than 100 seasons, comprising 12462 games), we found that the distribution of the winning margin is not significantly different from the normal distribution at 5% significance level (equation 1a). We used four alternative tests for normality; Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia, Skewness/Kurtosis and Interquartile Range (IQR), and find that the above results are consistent between the different seasons. 31 The histogram of the winning margin for the line AFL betting market appears in Figure 1 . Therefore the true outcome of a game in the line market can be modeled as a normal random variable with mean equal to the point spread, and equation (1a) implies that:
Equations (1a-1b) and (2a) reflect the most general definition of efficiency, and a variety of efficiency tests have been performed based on equations (1a) and (2a), although equation (1b) The basic statistical test of weak efficiency for the line betting market involves the following model:
where α is a constant and ε ijt is an independently and identically distributed random error. Equation (3a) is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), as we test the linear relationship between point spreads and lines.
The parallel test in the fixed odds betting market is estimating P[WIN ijt │Ω t-1 ]. The expected winning team in a game is the one with P>0.5 and the relevant test involves the following specification, using OLS as well:
Owing to the relatively low number of observations in our data subsets, we used the non-parametric bootstrap method to test the power of all our tests. Using bootstrap (with 1,000 replications) for OLS in both betting markets, present estimated biases for the coefficients which are far less then 25% of the standard errors, thus, should not be a serious concern (Efron, 1982) . Weak-form efficiency corresponds to the joint hypotheses with respect to equations (3a) and (3b) that α=0 and β=1. Dare & Holland (2004) tried to disentangle the favorite/underdog and home team biases in the case of markets with very few games played on neutral grounds, as in most US sports. Due to the distinctive feature of the AFL, that many games are played on neutral grounds, we are able to suggest a different approach in order to identify the relevant biases, whereby we divide the data into subsets and test for all possible biases via separate regressions.
32 Results for line and fixed odds markets for the subsets of the data noted above are reported in Table 3a and Table 3b , respectively. We examine the neutral category, as it provides us with the only test for a pure favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog bias, uncontaminated by home ground considerations, since all other regressions confound this question. And indeed, the category results imply efficiency for all models during all years, thus there is no evident favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog bias.
Results for the other categories imply that the AFL gambling market is not consistently efficient, as we find biases in favor of home teams in games played outside Victoria. We reject the efficiency hypothesis for home teams at 5% level in the line market and in the win market during 2002, 2004 and the whole period. We do not find such bias for games played in Melbourne or in Geelong (except 2003, 2004 in the line market in Geelong).
The rejection of efficiency in the other categories could be a result of home team, favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog biases. However, since the neutral category leads us to reject the presence of favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog biases, we may conclude that any biases in the relevant AFL gambling markets relate to the presence of an apparent home ground advantage.
Betting systems
To confirm the presence of the above-noted inefficiencies or otherwise, two simple betting systems were constructed in games played outside Victoria and in Geelong, both for line and fixed odds betting: (a) betting on all home teams and (b) betting on all neutral longshots/underdogs. The simulation results are presented in Table 4a and Table 4b , respectively. 
where W, L and B are, respectively, the number of wins, losses and total bets for a given scenario, and p=0.5. D is the mean dividend per scenario. Table 4a .
Following Tryfos et al (1984) , Gandar et al (1988) and Russo et al (1989) , we test the significance of the results in two ways; first, a Z-test for the null hypothesis that the successful bet rates are random (the assumption being that chance yields a fifty percent success rate). The second and more stringent test is Tryfos et al's (1984) Z-test for the null hypothesis that a given scenario is unprofitable against the alternative that it is profitable. If we insistent stringently upon a rejection of the two null Tables 4a and 4b are merely a case of the market lagging behind their improvement in performance and not a measure of chronic inefficiency.
Conclusions
In this paper we have tested the weak-form efficiency of the line and fixed odds betting markets for the Australian Football League over the four seasons, 2001 through 2004, and tried to disentangle the two different biases of favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog on one hand, and home team on the other.
We have shown that there is neither a favorite-longshot nor a favorite-underdog bias in either of these markets once the possibility of a home ground advantage has been removed. We have done this by taking advantage of the fact that many games in the AFL are played on neutral grounds.
However, where the home ground advantage is sufficiently great (namely, in games played outside Victoria but involving visiting interstate teams), the home teams appear to be under-bet. Our results for the intermediate case of Geelong are inconclusive. as well as the editor and two anonymous referees, for their helpful comments on earlier versions. 2 We thank an anonymous referee, for demonstrating the distinction between the concepts of favorite-underdog and favorite-longshot bias, as the latter term should not be applied to the point spread market at all because it refers to the possibility of different expected returns in different odds ranges, while in the point spread market
wagers are relatively at similar odds.
3 For thorough reviews of the literature, see Sauer (1998) and Vaughan Williams (1999) .
4 Busche & Hall (1988) in Hong Kong racetracks; Woodland & Woodland (1994) , Gandar, Zuber, Johnson & Dare (2002) (in some extent) and Woodland & Woodland (2003) , in the Major League Baseball (MLB); Swindler & Shaw (1995) , in a second tier Texas racetrack; and , in the National Hockey League (NHL). Woodland & Woodland (2003) , based on the fact that the proportion of underdog wins (beating the spread) in Gray & Gray (1997) and in Iskoe (1998) was 0.526 and 0.531, respectively, which is over half of their games, note that the reverse bias exists also in the National Football League (NFL) point spread market, yet there has been no empirical testing to support this finding. 5 See, for example, Schwartz & Barsky (1977) in baseball, football, ice hockey and college basketball; AmoakoAdu, Marmer & Yagil (1985) in the NFL; Golec & Tamarkin (1991) in the NFL and college football ; Courneya & Carron (1992) , listing 16 studies in different sports; Holder & Nevill (1997) in tennis and golf; Vergin & Sosik (1999) in the NFL; Gandar, Zuber & Lamb (2001) in the NBA and MLB; and Clarke (2005) in the AFL.
10 See Stefani & Clarke (1992) , who reported a home ground advantage for each of the AFL teams during 1980-1989, and a bigger advantage for teams outside of Melbourne and for those that do not share a home ground.
They were able to predict the correct winning team in 68 percent of games; Brailsford, Easton, Gray & Gray (1995) , who reported a favorite-longshot bias in the AFL. Their success rate from betting on home teams during 1987-1995 was 58 percent, yet the return rate was negative; Bailey & Clarke (2004) , who use data from 1997-2003 and present models predicting correctly up to 67 percent of winners, and producing betting profits of up to 15 percent; and Clarke (2005) who demonstrated that individual clubs have home ground advantages to different degrees, non-Victorian teams having a larger advantage. His results lend support to the conclusion that crowd effects are the main determinant of home ground advantage.
11 Initially, we divided the data set into two further categories, according to market expectations of the outcome; a priori close games and a priori one-sided games. Close games were defined as games in which the line (in its absolute value) is less than 17.5 (the median line over our sample). Nevertheless, since the results of the two categories do not differ significantly, we do not present them. Results are available upon request. 17 In contrast to the US market, the winning dividend per $1 point spread wager in the AFL is not fixed. The range of this dividend in our data of 2001-2004 was $1.78-$2.05, while in 66% of the games it was $1.9, and the average was $1.9 as well. We utilize in this paper the Australian usage of the term "dividend", which includes the original $1 bet. 18 The percentage of winning bets (WP) necessary to break even, 52.63 percent, is obtained by setting the expected value of the random variable, a gamble WP * 0.9 + (1 -WP) * (-1), equal to zero.
19 See, for further discussion, Vergin & Scriabin (1978) , Gandar, Zuber, O'Brien & Russo (1988) , and Dana & Knetter (1994) . 20 The range of actual payouts in our data set is $1.03-$10, while the average sum is $2.36. 21 The average bookmakers' commission during our 2001-2004 data was 3.9%, while the average during 1998-2004 was 5.5%. Bailey & Clarke (2004) noted that the commission could be as low as 2-3%. 22 In the event the outcome is identical to the line, known as a "push" or a "no bet", the gambler's wager is refunded. In the very rare event where the outcome is a draw, the fixed odds bettor wins half the amount he would have won had his team won. Our data contains only 5 draws (0.7%). One can bet on a draw for most games at odds of 65 to 1, but this is part of an exotic category of bets. Note that this seems a high price given that there are over 700 games in our sample! 23 Nonetheless, Levitt (2004) noted that the adjustments in the line/odds are typically small and relatively infrequent; in the five days preceding an NFL game, the posted price changing an average of 1.4 times per game, and in 85 percent of those changes, the line moved by the minimum increment of one-half of a point. Yet, he noted that in horse racing, the odds set by bookmakers change more frequently. Avery & Chevalier (1999) noted that in 64 percent of NFL's games during 1983-1994 the line moved by half a point in the week prior to the game, and in 85 percent -by one point. Unfortunately, we do not have the relevant data for the AFL in order to shed more light on this.
24 These methods include: Even money line (also known as Points), which is simply a "double or nothing" line bet, i.e., the bettor will either lose his stake or double it; Draw, where the bettor bets on the chance that the final result will be a draw; Point spread in 10 point gaps; 1-39 and 40+, where the bettor bets on the chance that the point spread will be between 1 and 39 points and 40 or above, respectively; Highest scoring quarter; First goal scorer in each quarter; Most goals kicked; Most free kicks; and also different future odds bets, including 33 Statistical results for this category could not be obtained, since the home teams won all of these games. 34 It should be noted that the betting simulations in Table 4a and Table 4b are using in-sample data, yet they suffice to make our point. Before recommending them as a basis for betting in practice, out-of-sample tests would obviously need to be conducted! 35 This differs from Tryfos, Casey, Cook, Leger & Pylpiak (1984) and their successors, Gandar et al (1988) and Russo, Gandar & Zuber (1989) , as they tested the NFL line betting market where the winning odds are fixed at 10 to 11. We expand Tryfos et al's (1984) test to include not only a constant dividend (as in the NFL line market), but also variety of fixed dividends (as in the AFL line and fixed odds markets). 36 The equivalent results of Tryfos et al (1984) and Gandar et al (1988) were 3 profitable scenarios out of 70, and 0 out of 14, respectively. 
